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Abstract: The European sovereign crisis that followed the 2008 crisis showed that rules-
based fiscal policy is insufficient in itself in order to avoid fiscal alcoholism and excessive 
sovereign debt. Nevertheless, these policies have become more and more widespread in 
order to limit indebtedness. This article deals with one of the most important elements of 
rules-based systems: the fiscal council. The key question imposed was: is it mostly a 
European phenomenon, or rather a global standard? Is there a divergence between the EU 
and non-EU fiscal councils, or not? As a method, we employed descriptive statistics, then 
a hierarchical cluster analysis, based on the data of the IMF Fiscal Council Dataset. In 
conclusion, an EU and a non-EU cluster were formed, thus our working hypothesis was 
mostly underpinned. Our results have thus contributed to the literature and advanced the 
case that the increased number of fiscal councils can be attributed to European regulations 
or internal political issues rather than strengthening of fiscal prudency. 
Keywords: rules-based fiscal policy, fiscal council, independent fiscal institutions, fiscal 
prudency 
JEL codes: E02, E62, F36, H61, H68 
1 Introduction: establishment of Independent Fiscal Institutions 
The European sovereign crisis that followed the 2008 crisis shed light on the fact that rules-
based fiscal policy, which contains an explicit rule on the current deficit and the debt limit 
(adopted by the Stability and Growth Pact at the European Union level), is insufficient in 
itself (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2011). It became broadly clear that fiscal rules alone are 
insufficient, as they cannot ensure fiscal discipline and its sustainability. For this reason, 
experts started to look for new methods to enforce budgetary discipline. Extensive 
attention was paid to the establishment and reinforcement of independent fiscal institutions 
(IFI).  
In a European context, a specific proposal was raised in the early 2000s. Already at that 
time, Wyplosz (2002) predicted that rules-based budgets would never solve the 
fundamental economic policy problem and the consequent inclination to generate deficit. 
He proposed that every Member State should be required to set up a fiscal policy committee 
independent of the government, under the control of people with the appropriate 
professional background, and with a mandate to maintain the sovereign debt over the 
medium term. Larch and Braendle (2018) also considered it logical to take fiscal macro-
economic stability policy out of the hands of elected national governments. The concept 
was that independent fiscal institutions would determine the target deficit and the 
maximum allowed sovereign debt for the particular year. Elected politicians would be left 
with elbow room to determine the structure of fiscal revenues and expenditures, while 
observing the target deficit for the year. Short-term fiscal policy distortions could thus be 
eliminated. An additional argument regarding the euro area is that a better coordinated 
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fiscal stabilization policy would facilitate further economic and monetary integration, and 
could also increase the efficiency of the euro area’s centralized monetary policy. 
The initial, simple EU-level fiscal rules included in the Stability and Growth Pact have 
gradually been completed. Additions include, for example, the two amendments to the 
Stability and Growth Pact, and the “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance” 
(TSCG), in force since 2013, which contains new and more detailed provisions on the 
national limitation of fiscal policy discretion and on increasing EU-level fiscal co-ordination. 
In 2011, all Member States of the EU was officially requested to set up IFIs.  
The European Fiscal Board (EFB), which was established in 2015, is an independent body 
of the European Commission. It was set up for a fundamentally advisory function, and it 
assists the Commission in performing its multi-lateral fiscal supervisory functions for the 
euro area. The EFB’s duty is to provide an independent evaluation of the fiscal processes 
all over Europe, and more specifically in the entire euro area. In this sense, this institution 
can already be considered to be a preliminary institution of fiscal union. The European 
Commission makes considerable efforts to promote fiscal union and Acharya and Steffen 
(2017) and others, believe that the three unions are interrelated, as there can be no single 
government securities market without a fiscal union.  
The IMF papers are consistent with the EU’s intentions: Berger et al. (2018) think that 
without at least some degree of fiscal union, the EU will face existential risks and, for this 
reason, at least some kind of simplified fiscal union will be needed following the earliest 
possible completion of the banking union and capital market union. However, there are 
sceptics as well: according to Herzog (2018), even if the EU Commission thinks that without 
a supranational fiscal capacity the EMU will fail, it is not really feasible because of the 
resistance of the member states. Therefore, it would be better to “stick to and enhance 
the rule-based architecture of Maastricht” (Herzog, 2018). 
That said, a fiscal policy function independent of governments is not yet a political reality. 
For this reason, the fiscal councils that have been established so far have the following 
competences: forecasting, analysis, evaluation and consultation. A few countries have had 
independent institutions with fiscal control functions for a long time, actually for several 
decades. These include the Central Planning Bureau of the Netherlands, the Economic 
Council of Denmark and the High Council of Finance in Belgium. All of them are intended 
to supervise the discretional fiscal policies of the incumbent governments (watchdog 
function). 
It must be highlighted that the US-model (a Budget Office working closely with the 
legislature) was adopted by some countries. Such cases include Canada and Mexico (which 
neighbor the US), Australia and South Africa (with a common cultural and legal heritage) 
and, finally, South Korea. The later adopted its system gradually after the Asian sovereign 
crisis of 1998. 
IFIs have a highly heterogeneous practice. In some countries, IFIs have mandates 
exceeding the central government and covering all the other government sectors: 
decentralized agencies, local governments and state-owned companies. Consequently, IFIs 
have very different sizes: examples range from IFIs composed of a few persons 
(exclusively economists) to supervisory bodies with staffs of several hundreds. The latter 
are already fundamentally engaged in ex-post supervision and can be classified among 
audit offices/courts of auditors. IFIs are, fundamentally, fiscal institutions that perform ex-
ante assessment, while ex-post evaluation is essentially conducted by courts of auditors 
(Kopits, 2016). The OECD summed up IFI good practices in one of their recommendations 
(OECD, 2014). Simultaneously, the IMF also developed its recommendations (IMF, 2013). 
The majority of the authors engaged in this topic (Debrun and Kumar, 2007; IMF, 2013; 
Kopits, 2016 and Beetsma and Debrun, 2016) describe fiscal council operation and 
structure as highly heterogeneous. Below it is shown that, in fact, there are relatively 
homogeneous groups according to the individual considerations. 
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The fundamental question of our study is whether fiscal councils can be considered as a 
basically European model or whether what we are witnessing is the evolution of a global 
standard.  
2 Methodology and Data  
This analysis is based on the IMF’s Fiscal Council Dataset (Debrun et al., 2017). This 
database contains data for 39 FCs in 37 countries as at the end of 2016. In addition to 
general information (the official name of the fiscal council, the date of its establishment or 
profound reform), the database includes the main features of the individual FCs’ 
competences (specific duties and the means of influencing fiscal policy) and key 
institutional characteristics (independence, accountability requirements and human 
resources). 
Our methodology seeks to find relatively homogenous groups in accordance with certain 
considerations. Our test hypothesis is that, in a breakdown by EU and non-EU, fiscal 
councils have different characteristics. As a first step, we will use descriptive statistical 
methods. In the second step, cluster analysis will be applied, the details of this analysis 
are based on the descriptive statistics, thus will be provided later. 
It is a general problem to manage in countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) where there 
are 2 operative fiscal councils, and thus the competences and responsibilities are divided 
between the 2 organizations. As these are usually handled in consolidated way, this 
analysis includes 37 councils, and it is noted whenever the sample includes 39 councils. 
3 Descriptive statistics: Results and Discussion 
The structure adopted by Debrun et al. (2017) is followed for the data processing. 
General information 
The following indicators were analyzed for each fiscal council: region (EU vs. non-EU); the 
year of foundation; the year of major changes to its mandate; if it is a parliamentary 
organization or a separate institution; which level of government is covered by its mandate. 
There was a major increase in the number of fiscal councils all over the world in response 
to the crisis. The major part of this increase can be linked to the EU’s mandatory regulation. 
In the case of IFIs outside the EU, it is mainly the larger developed countries with federal 
structures (Australia, Canada and the USA) that have adopted these institutions and 
provided them with legal and operational independence. In addition to a federal structure, 
the establishment of IFIs may in many cases be clearly related to episodes of fiscal crisis. 
In the case of developing countries, IMF and OECD recommendations may have a 
significant role in the establishment of IFIs. The non-federal South Korea is a special case, 
as the National Assembly Budget Office was set up in 1994, and then it was re-organized 
in 2000, in response to the 1998 crisis, in the form of a Legislative Counselling Office and 
a Budget Policy Office, and made completely independent in 2003 under the name of the 
National Assembly Budget Office. In 1998-1999, as a result of a crisis, the federal state of 
Mexico also established its own institution under the name of the Center for Public Finance 
Studies. Naturally, the latter two are advisory bodies to parliaments, established to 
improve the fiscal authenticity of the given countries after the crises, and otherwise follow 
the organizational pattern of the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (Curristine et al., 2013). 
The Australian (2012) and South African (2014) Parliamentary Budget Offices were 
launched with similar motives and follow a similar example.  
In Chile, the fiscal council established in 2013 was reformed in 2018 to increase its 
independence. However, the fiscal discipline policy was started in Chile in 2001 by the 
Fiscal Responsibility Law, which required that the structural balance must have a 1% 
surplus. Major changes were made to the mandate in 11 of the 39 councils (7 of them in 
the EU). The overwhelming majority of the changes (8) were made after, and as a response 
to, the crisis. 
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An important question is how this role appears institutionally: as a parliamentary fiscal 
advisory body independent of the government or as a body separate from parliament. As 
the IMF database does not include the latter breakdown, we have completed the database. 
Clearly, the typical institutional form in the EU is to have separate councils, while the 
practice outside the EU is mixed. Note that in the EU the national audit offices are assigned 
this role (in Lithuania and in Finland). 
Table 1 Institutional form 
 EU Non-EU 
Parliamentary organization 2 8 
Organization separate from Parliament 24 5 
Source: the authors, Note: In this case a sample of 39 councils were divided 
Another important difference between the EU and non-EU groups is in the competences of 
the fiscal councils. Fiscal councils outside the EU usually (with the exception of 4) have 
mandates that only cover the central budget. In the EU they have a wider scope 
everywhere: they supervise the complete field of public finances. 
Key elements of the mandate 
Every IFI conducts positive and descriptive analyses. More than half of the IFIs are 
empowered to carry out normative analyses (i.e. recommend action to achieve the specific 
fiscal objectives). In non-EU countries, only 31 percent of them have a normative 
competence, while in EU Member States, this ratio is 67 per cent. 
The most important activity IFIs perform is the predictive evaluation of the various aspects 
of fiscal developments. In an EU/non-EU breakdown, a significant difference is seen 
between the two groups. 
Table 2 Key mandate elements 
  Foreca
sting 
Forecast 
Assesmen
t 
Recom
mendati
ons 
Long-
term 
sustainab
ility1 
Consiste
ncy with 
objective
s2 
Costin
g of 
measu
res3 
Monitori
ng 
fiscal 
rules 
EU 38% 88% 71% 75% 96% 33% 100% 
Non-
EU 
62% 69% 77% 38% 54% 62% 31% 
Source: IMF Fiscal Council Dataset, Notes: 1) “Long-term sustainability” is defined as the long-term 
forecast of government balance and debt level. 2) “Consistency with objectives (beyond fiscal 
rules)” is defined as the assessment of government budgetary and fiscal performance in relation to 
fiscal objectives and strategic priorities. 3) "Costing of measures" is defined as the quantification of 
either short-term or long-term effects, or both, of measures and reforms. 
In the EU, every institution checks compliance with the various fiscal rules from a forward-
looking perspective, including the evaluation of forecasts and longer-term sustainability. 
In non-EU countries, these aspects are considerably less significant, as the emphasis is 
basically on forecasts and on the assessment of the short- and/or long-term impacts of 
public finance actions.  With the exception of 6 institutions (2 IFIs in the EU, and 4 in 
developing, non-EU countries), the majority conduct ex-post analyses. 
Responsibilities and means 
The following main instruments are used to influence the budget:  
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Table 3 Fiscal councils’ direct impact on the budget process (in %) 
 Forecasts used 
in the budget 
Binding 
forecasts 
Comply or 
explain 
Formal 
consultation  
or hearings 
Can stall 
the  
budget 
process 
EU 13% 8% 33% 63% 4% 
Non-
EU 
8% 0% 0% 23% 0% 
Source: IMF Fiscal Council Dataset 
Overall, it is clear that fiscal councils’ direct impact on the budget process is currently less 
significant; they are basically considered as advisory bodies. However, in the EU Member 
States, they have a set of relatively more powerful instruments. 
The other basic method they use is pressure through public opinion, and the provision of 
objective information to the public about budgeting procedures. All but one of the fiscal 
councils make public reports. Six of the 37 fiscal councils did not have data available on 
the evaluation of media impact. According to the IMF’s evaluation, 26 of 30 councils have 
a high media impact.  In the EU Member States where data was available, 95 per cent of 
the IFIs had a significant media impact, and this ratio was 64 per cent in non-EU councils. 
Independence 
Independence can be considered from a legal and from an operational perspective. Legal 
independence is when the council’s independence from political intervention is ensured by 
law or contract. However, de facto operational independence from politics may be 
implemented even in the absence of legal independence, due to the council’s independent 
expertise. Note that in our opinion, in an undemocratic country (Iran) the term 
“independence” does not make any sense. 
88 per cent of the EU IFIs can be considered legally and 81 per cent operationally 
independent. In non-EU countries, the corresponding ratios were 69 and 54 per cent, 
respectively. If the latter is further subdivided into developed and developing non-EU 
countries, we get two markedly different groups. Merely 33 per cent of IFIs in developing 
non-EU countries show operational independence, and if Iran is removed from this group, 
the ratio is only 22 per cent. 
Resources 
The IMF database characterizes the human resources related to IFI management by several 
groups of variables. One such group of variables relates to the composition and content of 
the IFI: the headcount, the number of years mandated, whether mandates are renewable 
or not, the members’ backgrounds etc. This group has not been included in this analysis, 
as it is not considered a relevant indicator for our hypothesis. The other group of 
characteristics – which we consider relevant – concerns the selection and dismissal of IFI 
leaders. 
Less than half (46%) of the IFIs can appoint their leaders independently of the government. 
In terms of dismissal, IFI leaders are slightly more protected from the government. The 
third group of variables shows the size of IFIs based on the number of non-executive 
employees. The majority of IFIs are small in size: those employing more than 15 persons 
are already considered large (there are 13 of them). For this reason, in the cluster analysis 
the sample is divided into two: small and medium-sized/large institutions (with an 
employee headcount exceeding 15). 
4 Cluster analysis: Results and Discussion 
This research uses the method of hierarchical cluster analysis, i.e. the classification of 
countries in different groups called clusters. The Euclidean square–distance indicator is 
selected to determine the distance between countries. Ward’s method is used for 
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classification, as it reduces dispersion in groups and increases their homogeneity. The 
dissimilarity between two clusters is computed as the increase in the "error sum of squares" 
(ESS) after fusing two clusters into a single cluster. Ward's method chooses the successive 
clustering steps to minimize the increase in ESS at each step. For the calculation, we used 
Orange datamining software. 
The explanatory variables are those detailed under the title “Descriptive statistics”. Two 
constant variables (the year of establishment and the year of a major change) are omitted 
from the analysis for technical reasons (as during the cluster analysis they cannot be 
effectively used together with discrete variables) and, on the other hand, we wanted to 
form homogeneous groups of IFIs according to their operational characteristics at the end 
of 2016.  
Each of the other variables is transformed into a discrete numerical value (which may be 
0 or 1). The absence of data is marked by a separate variable (0 or 1). For example, the 
following 3 variables are defined for the selection of Governing / High-level Management 
Members: “Selected only by Government”, “Selected not only by Government”, and 
“Selected by n.a.”. If any data is missing, the last variable may be 1 and the others may 
be 0. Based on the above, we have 34 variables for each country. 
The results are depicted in a dendrogram. We also applied a multi-dimensional scaling 
(MDS) technique in our database. The primary result of the MDS analysis is a two-
dimensional visualization of countries, expressed as distances between points displaying 
the similarity of objects. 
The below two figures (Figure 1 and Figure 2) clearly show the two main clusters: in 
practice, an EU vs. non-EU breakdown. The cluster analysis includes South Africa, Iran and 
Peru in the EU group. Germany is transferred to the non-EU group. If the regional variable 
is removed a similar result is given, which underpins the robustness of our result. As we 
can also observe, the countries which adopted the US-model were in the same clusters, 
with the exception of South Africa. 
Figure 1 1st Dendrogram 
 
Source: the authors’ cluster analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 MDS Two-dimensional Results 
 
Source: the authors’ cluster analysis 
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Below (Figure 3) is a cluster analysis of factors in order to use the factor characteristic of 
a cluster rather than a large number of factors. Factors are classified into the following 8 
clusters. One factor was selected of each of the eight clusters (long-term sustainability; 
normative analysis; parliament or independent body; consultation or hearing; budget 
safeguard; forecast preparation; dismissal only by government; selected not only by 
government). Having selected these 8 factors, the cluster analysis was run again (see the 
results at Figure 4).  
Figure 3 Dendrogram of Factors 
 
Source: the authors’ cluster analysis 
Figure 4 2nd Dendrogram  
 
Source: the authors’ cluster analysis 
The EU vs. non-EU groups clearly separated in this case as well. Note that in this case the 
results are already sensitive to which of the 8 indicators are selected from among the above 
variable clusters, as the number of variables has been reduced considerably. Depending 
on this, the countries at the border of the two clusters may drift from one cluster to the 
other. 
Overall, our cluster analysis and its sensitivity test has reinforced the experiences detailed 
in the descriptive part, namely that the characteristics of fiscal councils differ in an EU vs. 
non-EU breakdown. Another important phenomenon of the second dendrogram is that the 
US-model-adopting country-group has become clearly visible in the non-EU cluster. 
5 Conclusions 
In order to improve the regulation and methodology of fiscal surveillance, much has been 
done at the national and international level, but the ex-post control of public finances, the 
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rule-based budget and fiscal controlling cannot fully prevent fiscal imbalances. Therefore, 
independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) have been established in many countries. 
The literature emphasizes the heterogeneity of fiscal councils. In contrast, our cluster 
analysis confirms the hypothesis that there is a divergence between the EU and non-EU 
Fiscal Councils.  
The separation between the two groups can be captured by the following features. 
Regarding the institutional form, EU IFIs are typically a body separate from the parliament, 
while outside the EU there are considerably more IFIs that may be linked to the parliament. 
In terms of the key mandate elements, in the EU every institution checks compliance with 
the various fiscal rules from a forward-looking perspective, while in non-EU countries IFIs 
have considerably less weight. In the latter, the stress falls primarily on forecasts and on 
the assessment of the short- and/or long-term impacts of major public finance actions. In 
an analysis of the influence on fiscal processes, it can be established that currently fiscal 
councils’ direct impact on the budget process is less significant; they are basically 
considered as advisory bodies. Nevertheless, in the EU Member States, they have a set of 
relatively more powerful instruments in this area.  
Practically everywhere (95%) in the EU, IFIs have an indirect impact, through the media, 
while not all non-EU IFIs have it (64%). Most IFIs have both legal and operational 
independence in the EU, while this ratio is also lower among non-EU IFIs. In non-EU 
developing countries, it is particularly low.  
In our opinion, one of the main causes of divergence between IFIs in the EU and in non-
EU countries is that, in the EU, the strengthening of IFIs is supported by an increase in 
fiscal cohesion and the longer-term objective of the fiscal union. This process is accelerated 
by the common European regulation and other integration policies (common crisis 
management mechanism, banking and capital market union). In contrast, outside the EU 
the establishment of IFIs is triggered by federal organization, on the one hand, and the 
need to respond to the reduction of fiscal authenticity caused by crises, on the other hand.  
The IMF and the OECD have also contributed to the latter. An additional factor is the 
adoption of similar patterns (USA) operative outside the EU. For this reason, in normal 
circumstances central government politicians in non-EU countries may not be expected to 
voluntarily give up discretional fiscal policy or, even if they adopt a rules-based fiscal policy, 
to “voluntarily” establish genuinely independent supervisory institutions. Based on the 
above, IFIs can very much be considered a European solution rather than the evolution of 
a new global standard. 
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